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7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 HODL LAW, PLLC) Case No.: **'22CV1832 BEN JLB**
10 *Plaintiff,*)
11 vs.) **COMPLAINT**
12 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE) Civil:
13 COMMISSION)
14 *Defendant.*) 1) Request For Declaratory Relief
15) That The Ethereum Network
16) And Ether Digital Currency
17) Unit Are Not Securities Or
18) Investment Contracts Under
19) The Federal Securities Act Of
20) 1933

19 Plaintiff Hodl Law, PLLC (“Hodl Law”) alleges the following against the
20 Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter “SEC” or “Defendant”), based on
21 personal knowledge, the investigation of counsel, and information and belief.
22

23 **INTRODUCTION**

24 1. Plaintiff, a law firm that focuses on legal and regulatory issues regarding
25 digital assets (also known as digital currency units (“DCUs”) and/or cryptocurrencies),
26 requests declaratory relief in the face of years-long, purposeful delay and obfuscation by
27 the Defendant regarding its jurisdictional authority with respect to this technology. For
28 over fourteen years, the Defendant has vaguely and ambiguously asserted its “right” to

1 police digital assets as securities yet has refused to identify more than one digital asset
2 that it believes is a security *prior to* initiating enforcement actions.

3 2. This intentional, weaponized ambiguity as to why the Defendant provides
4 no guidance or rules regarding its view of DCUs is perhaps best summarized by its then-
5 Senior Adviser for Digital Assets and Innovation, Valerie Szczepanik. When asked at a
6 public event whether she believed the Defendant’s lack of earnest guidance on DCUs was
7 sufficient, Ms. Szczepanik responded: “I think if you were to start down road of being
8 very prescriptive and putting out specific releases about hypothetical situations, not only
9 would you probably waste a lot of time but you would probably create a road map to get
10 around it.”

11 3. This deliberate approach by the Defendant has unsurprisingly bestowed
12 upon itself maximum prosecutorial discretion over an asset class for which it has no
13 jurisdiction from Congress. Recent email disclosures by the Defendant—compelled by
14 two federal district court judges over Defendants’ multiple objections—suggest the
15 Defendant’s entire strategy is to be deliberately “confusing” in order to maintain
16 maximum flexibility to prosecute at will (and without fair notice).

17 4. Yet the danger to Plaintiff is very serious and imminent. For example, as
18 recently as July 21, 2022, the Defendant filed a civil complaint against three individual
19 employees at cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase Global, Inc. (“Coinbase”), alleging the
20 defendants engaged in “insider trading in certain crypto asset securities” while working
21 at Coinbase.¹ The Defendant alleged those “unregistered securities” were the DCUs
22 known as AMP, RLY, XYT, RGT, LCX, POWR, DFX, and KROM.²
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26 ¹ See *SEC v. Wahi, et. al.*, Case No. 22-CV-01009 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2022) at
27 ¶ 1.

28 ² See *id.* at ¶ 39 (AMP), ¶ 45 (RLY), ¶ 50 (DDX), ¶ 57 (XYO and RGT), ¶ 71
(LCX), ¶ 78 (POWR), and ¶ 82 (DFX and KROM).

1 5. Despite the above DCUs existing and trading on the market for *one-to-five*
2 *years* (depending on the specific DCU), the Defendant never once asserted to the
3 investing public that it believed these DCUs were securities under federal law—until the
4 Defendant launched the enforcement action.

5 6. Plaintiff engages in transactional activity on the Ethereum Network, along
6 with literally millions of other users worldwide, which requires use of the Ether DCU (at
7 times referred to as “ETH”) in order to conduct such transactions. The Defendant has
8 refused to provide Plaintiff—and millions of other network users—any concrete guidance
9 as to whether such activity could, at the Defendant’s whim, be prosecuted as engaging in
10 the sale of unregistered securities.

11 7. To color the magnitude of Defendant’s egregious conduct, the current
12 market capitalization of the Ethereum Network is measured in the hundreds of billions of
13 dollars.

14 8. Consequently, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory ruling from the Court that
15 engaging in transactional activities on the Ethereum Network using the Ether DCU does
16 not implicate the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a *et seq.* (herein the “Securities
17 Act”).

18 9. Ultimately, the economic reality of blockchain networks and DCUs simply
19 does not provide the Defendant with a roving commission to regulate *every* outlay of
20 funds that the SEC claims may benefit from the registration and disclosure requirements
21 of securities laws.

22
23 **NATURE OF PROCEEDING**
24 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**
25 **RELIEF SOUGHT**

26 10. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the authority conferred upon it
27 pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57.
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1 11. Plaintiff further seeks the necessary and proper relief of attorney fees
2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 as Defendant has willfully and callously failed to confirm
3 or deny its intent to assert jurisdiction over the Ethereum Network and ETH for *eight*
4 *years* and despite hundreds of requests from everyday users the Defendant only exists
5 *solely* in order to purportedly “protect.”

6 12. The federal Securities Act defines what are—and what are not—securities.

7 13. The law vests Defendant with narrowly tailored jurisdiction to regulate the
8 securities markets and to bring actions for violations of the federal securities laws. This
9 action represents a federal question and thus this district has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
10 U.S.C. § 1331.

11 14. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Securities
12 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v and 78aa.

13 15. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment
14 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a), as the Defendant
15 transacts business in the district; and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as the Defendant, a
16 federal agency, is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.

17 16. Plaintiff seeks a final judgment permanently enjoining Defendant from
18 asserting any of its limited jurisdiction under the Securities Act as it pertains to the
19 Ethereum Network and its native DCU, Ether, as ETH is not, never was, and cannot be
20 considered a “security” or “investment contract.”

21 **THE PARTIES**

22 17. Plaintiff Hodl Law is an Arizona professional limited liability company that
23 engages in the practice of law with respect to digital assets and cryptocurrencies. Such
24 practice involves utilizing digital assets and cryptocurrencies.

25 18. Hodl Law transacts on the Ethereum Network and utilizes the Ether DCU
26 for a variety of use cases.
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1 19. Defendant is a federal government agency that has transacted business,
2 maintained substantial contacts, and/or committed overt acts in furtherance of its attempts
3 to act outside its limited, federal jurisdiction throughout the United States with respect to
4 DCUs, including this district. The scheme has been directed at, and has had the intended
5 effect of, causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing business throughout
6 the United States, including this district.

7 20. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, itself or through its agents
8 and/or independent contractors, transacts on the Ethereum Network and utilizes the Ether
9 DCU for a variety of purposes.

10 21. Upon information and belief, the Defendant has permitted its employees to
11 buy and sell Ether DCUs without restriction since the network’s launch through the
12 present.

13 **SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS**

14 **I. DIGITAL ASSETS AND THE ETHEREUM NETWORK.**

15 **A. The Blockchain Network And Its Origins.**

16 22. This case concerns cryptocurrencies.³ Cryptocurrencies are digital assets
17 that employ cryptographic mechanisms to secure transactions, control the creation of
18 additional units, and verify transactions. The underlying framework that permits this
19 process to function is called “the blockchain.”

20 23. Before blockchain technology, the primary obstacle preventing the creation
21 of cryptocurrencies was the “double-spend” problem. Previously, digital files were
22 transmitted by duplication of the file itself. If one were to email or text a photo to another,
23 the transaction resulted in the photo being duplicated—the sender and recipient both had
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25 ³ “Cryptocurrencies” is the common term used in the popular culture to refer
26 broadly to digital assets, which are “tokens” created on the blockchain and are a
27 fundamental component that permits blockchain technology to function.
28 Cryptocurrencies, digital assets, crypto-assets, DCUs are all different ways to refer to the
same token-blockchain concept described herein.

1 an exact copy. This problem stopped the ability of a digital asset to have value as there
2 was no mechanism to prevent infinite duplication.

3 24. The creation of the blockchain solved this problem in an elegant manner.
4 The blockchain is a digital ledger that tracks the ownership and transactional history of
5 its native cryptocurrency. Bitcoin is the native DCU of the first blockchain network. The
6 Bitcoin blockchain thus tracks every transaction of every Bitcoin in existence. Every
7 Bitcoin owner receives a digital address in order to take ownership of Bitcoin. The
8 Bitcoin blockchain publicly lists every digital address and the amount of Bitcoin tied to
9 that address. Every transaction from every address is publicly available and, for practical
10 purposes, immutable.

11 25. Consequently, because of its openness and immutability, Bitcoin provides a
12 secure transaction mechanism to exchange value among parties. Transactions cannot be
13 counterfeited or otherwise reversed.

14 26. While Bitcoin was the first blockchain, numerous other blockchains have
15 been created since Bitcoin. Many are now faster, more scalable, and less environmentally
16 degrading than the Bitcoin Network. But like Bitcoin, nearly every blockchain utilizes a
17 cryptocurrency, digital asset, DCU, *etc.* Many more such assets have also been created
18 on top of existing blockchains. The properties, variability and capabilities of blockchains
19 are dependent on the software coding of each one. Unlike Bitcoin, some blockchains
20 allow the reversal of transactions. Other blockchains use different consensus mechanisms
21 to verify transactions.

22 27. Ownership of cryptocurrencies is similar to the ownership structure of
23 bearer bonds. Unlike a bearer bond where the presumed owner is whoever holds the
24 physical paper on which the bond is issued, the owner of a cryptocurrency is whoever
25 holds the cryptographic keys. These keys have two components, a public and private key.
26 The public key is the digital address that is publicly accessible and which the parties must
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1 know in order to execute a transaction. The private key is what permits the owner to
2 access the public address and initiate or confirm a transaction.

3 **B. The Ethereum Network And Its Native Digital Currency Unit, Ether.**

4 28. In 2013, the concept of the Ethereum Network was publicized in a white
5 paper by Vitalik Buterin, a Russian-born Canadian programmer that had developed an
6 early interest in the first blockchain network, Bitcoin.

7 29. As explained by Buterin, one purpose of the imagined-Ethereum Network
8 was to move beyond Bitcoin's vision as a payment network by creating decentralized
9 applications on the Ethereum Network.

10 30. During the Bitcoin Conference in Miami in January 2014, Buterin teamed
11 up with several other individuals to help assist him in making the Ethereum Network a
12 reality. Ultimately, a large cohort of additional individuals would coalesce to assist in the
13 creation of the Ethereum Network. They included Gavin Wood, Charles Hoskinson,
14 Anthony Di Iorio, Mihai Alisie, Amir Chetrit, Jefferey Wilcke and Joseph Lubin
15 (collectively referred to as the "Ethereum Creators").

16 31. The Ethereum Creators created a Swiss company, EthSuisse, to act as the
17 entity tasked with development of the Ethereum Network. Another Swiss company, the
18 Ethereum Foundation, was created to also assist in the development of the Ethereum
19 Network (EthSuisse and the Ethereum Foundation are herein included in the term
20 "Ethereum Creators").

21 32. In order to raise money for the development of the Ethereum Network, the
22 Ethereum Creators conducted an Initial Coin Offering ("ICO") in 2014, in which public
23 investors could purchase the Ether DCU.

24 33. The official launch of the Ethereum Network occurred on July 30, 2015.

25 34. From the inception of the Ethereum Network through its launch in 2015,
26 Defendant was aware of the Ethereum project and that the Ethereum Creators sold the
27 Ether DCU via an ICO. During this time frame, Defendant did not take any action to warn
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1 any investors that creation of the Ethereum Network (aka computer software) was a
2 security nor warned that the Ether DCU was a security.

3 35. From its 2015 launch through June 14, 2018, the Ethereum Network
4 continued to operate and develop, undergoing multiple upgrades to improve its
5 functionality. During this same time, the Ether DCU continued to be bought, sold, traded,
6 used and/or otherwise exchanged by hundreds of thousands of network users. In terms of
7 transactions occurring on the Ethereum Network, they numbered in the millions.

8 36. During this time, Defendant never advised any member of the investing
9 public that using the Ethereum Network or the Ether DCU constituted engagement in
10 unregistered securities transactions.

11 37. In fact, during this same time frame the Defendant received thousands of
12 inquiries from the public explicitly asking Defendant its position on the security status of
13 the Ethereum Network and the Ether DCU. In response to all inquiries, Defendant refused
14 to state its official position either way.

15 38. In fact, during this same time frame the Defendant explicitly permitted its
16 employees to buy and sell the Ether DCU without restriction. Defendant was aware that
17 its employees were buying and selling the Ether DCU during this time period.

18 39. Hodl Law did not exist during this time period. The firm had no connection
19 and has no connection to the Ethereum Creators. Hodl Law did not participate in the
20 Ethereum Creators' ICO.

21 **C. Thousands Of DCU Projects Do Not Create Their Own Blockchain And**
22 **Instead Build Upon The Ethereum Network.**

23 40. Blockchain-based projects have the ability to build on top of existing
24 blockchains by minting new digital assets that require the underlying blockchain to
25 operate. The Ethereum Network is the most popular blockchain upon which other DCUs
26 are developed. Using this blockchain as an example, a startup project can "airdrop" its
27 newly-created token into the digital asset address of pre-existing users of the Ethereum
28 Network. For example, if a project is going to airdrop 30 of its newly-created digital

1 assets on the Ethereum Network, individual public addresses simply receive 30 units of
2 the new token. For example, an entire class of projects have created “ERC-20” tokens
3 upon the Ethereum Network.

4 41. Although the Defendant refuses to provide advance notice to the public
5 regarding which ERC-20 tokens it subjectively decides are securities prior to filing an
6 enforcement action, it has nevertheless affirmed in federal court that it believes, at
7 minimum, at least some ERC-20 tokens are securities.⁴

8 **II. HODL LAW DOES NOT HAVE ANY OF THE NECESSARY CONTACTS**
9 **WITH A COMPUTER NETWORK TO RENDER SOFTWARE CODE AN**
10 **ISSUER OF SECURITIES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT.**

11 **A. Hodl Law’s Use Of The Ethereum Network And Purchase Of Ether**
12 **DCUs Lack The Essential Ingredients Of Securities.**

13 42. Under the Securities Act, the definition of “security” is based on a defined
14 list of specific instruments, including “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
15 security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
16 participation in any profit-sharing agreement” or “investment contract.” 15 U.S.C. §
17 77b(a).

18 43. Of the defined set of “securities,” the Defendant’s only credible argument
19 that a computer network falls within that set is if the network is held to be an “investment
20 contract.”

21 44. The Securities Act does not define, however, the term “investment contract.”

22 45. Throughout the course of over a century of case law, the U.S. Supreme Court
23 has held that any particular set of circumstances requires certain “essential ingredients”
24 in order to be considered an investment contract.

25 46. First, one or more contracts establish the rights and obligations of the parties.

26 47. Second, investors provide capital and share in the earnings and profits of the
27 project.

28 ⁴ See *SEC v. Wahi, et. al.*, Case No. 22-CV-01009 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2022) at ¶ 20.

1 48. Third, a promotor of the project manages, controls and operates the project
2 for the benefit of investors and provides a return on their investments based on their
3 respective shares.

4 49. From the last *eight years* through the present, the Defendant has refused to
5 state whether the Ethereum Network and its native Ether DCU are “investment contracts”
6 and therefore securities under the Securities Act. The Defendant has refused to make any
7 official statement as to whether the offer and sale of the Ether DCUs constitute an offer
8 and sale of a “security” that require registration with the Defendant under the Securities
9 Act.

10 50. At the same time, the SEC coyly implies that every transfer of (or offer to
11 transfer) the intangible asset ETH since 2014 through the present (whether by Hodl Law,
12 the Ethereum Creators, the original issuers of Ether DCUs, retail purchasers, or anyone
13 else) was the offer and sale of a regulated “investment contract.”⁵

14 51. Hodl Law transacts on the Ethereum Network and has acquired Ether DCUs.

15 52. Hodl Law acquired Ether DCUs through popular U.S. cryptocurrency
16 exchanges like Coinbase and Payward, Inc. dba Kraken (“Kraken”).

17 53. Both Coinbase and Kraken have publicly stated neither company believes
18 the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU are securities under the Securities Act.

19 54. The Defendant is fully cognizant that both Coinbase and Kraken utilize the
20 Ethereum Network and offer Ether DCUs for sale to the American public. It would
21 follow, therefore, that Defendant has likely *privately* communicated its subjective belief
22 that the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU are not securities.
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26 ⁵ See, e.g., *SEC v. Balina*, Case No. 1:22-CV-950 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2022) at ¶
27 69 (Defendant apparently claiming the Ethereum Network is a security because “ETH
28 contributions were validated by a network of notes on the Ethereum [Network], which
are clustered more densely in the United States than in any other country”).

1 55. Hodl Law has zero connection to the Ethereum Creators and original issuers
2 of Ether DCUs.

3 56. Hodl Law neither purchased nor acquired Ether DCUs from the Ethereum
4 Creators or the original issuers of Ether DCUs.

5 57. Hodl Law did not execute any written contracts with the Ethereum Creators,
6 the original issuers of Ether DCUs, or the computer network itself when the firm acquired
7 ETH or transacted on the Ethereum Network. The initial 2014 distribution of Ether DCUs
8 took place without any contract between Hodl Law and any of the Ethereum Creators
9 and/or original issuers of Ether DCUs.

10 58. Hodl Law has zero expectations, rights or benefits to any post-sale
11 obligations from the Ethereum Creators and/or original issuers of the Ether DCUs.
12 Therefore there can be no “investment contract” without post-sale obligations by these
13 promoters to the purchaser, Hodl Law.

14 59. Hodl Law has no rights to receive any profits from the Ethereum Creators
15 and/or original issuers of the Ether DCUs.

16 60. The Defendant has the burden to show that each specific acquisition and use
17 of Ether DCUs by Hodl Law is an investment contract.

18 61. The Defendant has the burden to show that each transaction on the Ethereum
19 Network by Hodl Law is an investment contract.

20 62. The Defendant cannot show any contractual provision requiring the
21 Ethereum Creators and/or original issuers of Ether DCUs—directly or indirectly—to take
22 post-sale actions to create profits for, share profits with, or return value to Hodl Law as
23 an Ethereum Network user and/or owner of Ether DCUs.

24 63. The Defendant concedes that Hodl Law’s use of the Ethereum Network,
25 based solely on Hodl Law’s status as a user of the network, does *not* have the right to
26 receive any dividends from the Ethereum Creators and/or original issuers of Ether DCUs.
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1 64. The Defendant concedes that Hodl Law’s ownership of Ether DCUs, based
2 solely on Hodl Law’s status as an owner of ETH, does *not* have the right to receive any
3 dividends from the Ethereum Creators and/or original issuers of Ether DCUs.

4 **III. DEFENDANT HAS ENGAGED IN PURPOSEFUL, WEAPONIZED**
5 **AMBIGUITY IN FLAGRANTLY ACTING OUTSIDE ITS JURISDCITION**
6 **AND VIOLATING ITS STATUTORY MANDATE.**

7 65. Defendant has refused to provide public guidance on its subjective belief
8 regarding the classification status of the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU despite
9 thousands of requests from the American public.

10 66. As stated above, the Ether DCU was originally created and then sold to
11 investors in an ICO. Since its ICO the Ether DCU has been bought, sold and otherwise
12 utilized throughout millions of transactions over eight years. During these past eight
13 years, despite Defendant’s notice and knowledge of all of the above, the Defendant never
14 promulgated one regulation, rule or even an official statement that the Ethereum Network
15 or the Ether DCU were (in Defendant’s eyes) securities under the Securities Act.

16 67. Yet, at the same, Defendant has engaged in purposeful, public ambiguity to
17 maximize its “flexibility” to assert jurisdiction if its whims changed. As one of many
18 examples, on June 6, 2018, then-SEC Chairman Walter Joseph “Jay” Clayton, III
19 (“Clayton”) sat for an interview on CNBC with Bob Pisani to discuss cryptocurrency and
20 the SEC’s involvement in the space. When Mr. Pisani described the general process of a
21 cryptocurrency ICO, Clayton responded: “That is a security and [the SEC] regulate[s]
22 that.” Mr. Pisani persisted: “You’re saying the way [the SEC looks] at most ICOs, they
23 are securities?” Clayton answered: “Correct.” Logically, Mr. Pisani followed up by
24 asking Clayton if the second largest DCU by market cap, Ether, was a security: “There
25 are other altcoins out there. There’s Ether, for example . . . Is Ether a security?” Clayton
26 responded cryptically: “Bob, I’m not going to comment on specific crypto assets, whether
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1 they are or are not a security.”⁶ Not exactly inspiring, clear guidance for the public from
2 Defendant.

3 68. Clayton finished his regulatory career as SEC Chairman having never
4 informed the American public whether the SEC considered the Ethereum Network or the
5 Ether DCU to be a security under the Securities Act—despite being directly asked
6 numerous times.⁷

7 69. In 2018, while he was a then-professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
8 Technology (“MIT”) teaching a course titled “Blockchain and Money,” current SEC
9 Commissioner Gary G. Gensler (“Gensler”) consistently stated his personal opinion was
10 that the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU should be regulated as securities under the
11 Securities Act.⁸

12 70. During his entire stint as the current SEC Commissioner, Gensler has never
13 informed the American public whether Defendant considers the Ethereum Network or
14 the Ether DCU to be securities under the Securities Act.

15 71. In fact, although Gensler has been asked dozens of times as to whether the
16 Defendant believes the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU are securities—by Congress,
17 financial reporters, and financial institutions—he has responded exactly like his
18 predecessor.

19 72. Gensler has, however, *hinted* that he believes the Ethereum Network and
20 Ether DCU are securities under the Securities Act.
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23 ⁶ This video interview is publicly available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8YtZJRUak8E>.

24 ⁷ Coincidentally, Clayton would leave the SEC in December 2020 to ultimately
25 work part-time at a financial services firm that focuses on Ether DCU investments.

26 ⁸ See, e.g., MIT OpenCourseWare, “Primary Markets, ICOs & Venture Capital,
27 Part 2,” Gensler, G., publicly available at [https://www.youtube.com/
28 watch?v=7EXcHqLg7BI&list=PLU14u3cNGP63UUkfl0onkxF6MYgVa04Fn&index=
19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EXcHqLg7BI&list=PLU14u3cNGP63UUkfl0onkxF6MYgVa04Fn&index=19) (beginning at 40:12) (Gensler announcing “Ethereum, when it was first promoted in
2014, I believe passed this test. And the word ‘passed’ means that you are a security”).

1 73. At the same time, Gensler has never clarified whether his public musings on
2 the security status of the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU are his personal opinion or
3 the opinion of the Defendant.

4 74. At the same time, through its agents and officers, Defendant has previously
5 made many public comments that the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU are neither
6 securities nor investment contracts.

7 75. Prior to Gensler taking over from Clayton as SEC Chair, and while Clayton
8 was Chair, Clayton hired William H. Hinman (“Hinman”) to serve as Defendant’s
9 Director of the Division of Corporate Finance.

10 76. Hinman joined the Defendant in May 2017, leaving a globally recognized
11 law firm where, prior to his departure for the Defendant, he became intricately aware of
12 the value of cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, and the immense wealth one could
13 accumulate with well-timed investments in both.

14 77. Within this context, Hinman agreed to attend a public, televised financial
15 conference in his capacity as Director of the Division of Corporate Finance. The June 14,
16 2018 conference was named, “Yahoo! Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto.”

17 78. Hinman agreed to attend the conference, in part, because he intended to
18 provide a seminal speech on the Defendant’s position with respect to digital assets.

19 79. As Hinman took the stage at the conference, behind him emblazoned in large
20 font was an electronic display that read “DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF
21 CORPORATE FINANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.”

22 80. Hinman was not invited to speak on behalf of himself; rather, he was invited
23 to speak in his capacity as the Defendant’s Director of the Division of Corporate Finance.

24 81. Hinman titled his speech, “Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met
25 Gary (Plastic).” This speech is publicly available on the Defendant’s government website.
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1 82. In the speech, Hinman went into great detail about how the Defendant would
2 evaluate digital asset projects and digital currency units and whether these were securities
3 under the Exchange Act.

4 83. Hinman enumerated several factors that the Defendant would analyze in
5 determining whether a digital asset project was sufficiently “decentralized” such that the
6 Defendant would not consider it a security under the Securities Act.

7 84. These factors include:⁹

8 a. Is there a person or group that has sponsored or promoted the creation and
9 sale of the digital asset, the efforts of whom paly a significant role in the development
10 and maintenance of the asset and its potential increase in value?

11 b. Has this person or group retained a stake or other interest in the digital asset
12 such that it would be motivated to expend efforts to cause an increase in value in the
13 digital asset? Would purchasers reasonably believe such efforts will be undertaken and
14 may result in a return on their investment in the digital asset?

15 c. Has the promoter raised an amount of funds in excess of what may be needed
16 to establish a functional network, and, if so, has it indicated how those funds may be used
17 to support the value of the tokens or to increase the value of the enterprise? Does the
18 promoter continue to expend funds from proceeds or operations to enhance the
19 functionality and/or value of the system within which the tokens operate?

20 d. Are purchasers “investing,” that is, seeking a return? In that regard, is the
21 instrument marketed and sold to the general public instead of to potential users of the
22 network for a price that reasonably correlates with the market value of the good or service
23 in the network?
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27 ⁹ See Hinman, William. “Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary
28 (Plastic).” SEC (6/14/18), *available at* <https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418>.

1 e. Does the application of the Securities Act protections make sense? Is there
2 a person or entity others are relying on that plays a key role in the profit-making of the
3 enterprise such that disclosure of their activities and plans would be important to
4 investors? Do informational asymmetries exist between the promoters and potential
5 purchasers/investors in the digital asset?

6 f. Do persons or entities other than the promoter exercise governance rights or
7 meaningful influence?

8 g. Is token creation commensurate with meeting the needs of users or, rather,
9 with feeding speculation?

10 h. Are independent actors setting the price or is the promoter supporting the
11 secondary market for the asset or otherwise influencing trading?

12 i. Is it clear that the primary motivation for purchasing the digital asset is for
13 personal use or consumption, as compared to investment? Have purchasers made
14 representations as to their consumptive, as opposed to their investment, intent? Are the
15 tokens available in increments that correlate with a consumptive versus investment
16 intent?

17 j. Are the tokens distributed in ways to meet users' needs? For example, can
18 the tokens be held or transferred only in amounts that correspond to a purchaser's
19 expected use? Are there built-in incentives that compel using the tokens promptly on the
20 network, such as having the tokens degrade in value over time, or can the tokens be held
21 for extended periods for investment?

22 k. Is the asset marketed and distributed to potential users or the general public?

23 l. Are the assets dispersed across a diverse user base or concentrated in the
24 hands of a few that can exert influence over the application?

25 m. Is the application fully functioning or in the early stages of development?
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1 85. Hinman also stated in his speech that “it is clear I believe a token once
2 offered in a security offering can, depending on the circumstances, later be offered in a
3 non-securities transaction.”

4 86. During his speech as Defendant’s Director of the Division of Corporate
5 Finance, Hinman announced that “based on my understanding of the present state of
6 Ether, the Ethereum [N]etwork and its decentralized structure, **current offers and sales
7 of Ether are not securities transactions.**” [emphasis added] “And, as with Bitcoin,
8 applying the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to current transactions in
9 Ether would seem to add little value.”

10 87. Though expansive and cleverly titled, Hinman did not come up with the
11 speech’s name or its contents on his own—despite making the claim at the outset that his
12 speech was his personal opinion.

13 88. Hinman did not disclose during his speech that it was the product of dozens
14 of drafts, consultations and revisions with multiple staff within multiple offices and
15 divisions of the Defendant.

16 89. Hinman did not disclose that his speech was part of Defendant’s strategy of
17 deliberate subterfuge to further confuse the public on the status of the Ethereum Network
18 and Ether DCU.

19 90. Hinman’s speech was circulated and reviewed among the following
20 positions at Defendant during the relevant time: (1) Special Counsel, Office of Small
21 Business Policy; (2) Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance; (3) Assistant Chief
22 Counsel, Division of Trading and Markets; (4) Associate Director, Division of Corporate
23 Finance; (5) Director, Division of Trading and Markets; (6) Chief Counsel, Division of
24 Trading and Markets; (7) Deputy Director and Senior Policy Advisor, Division of
25 Trading and Markets; (8) Fintech and Crypto Specialist, FinHub; (9) Chief of Staff; (10)
26 Deputy Chief of Staff; (11) Senior Advisor to Clayton; (12) Director, Division Of
27 Investment Management; (13) Co-Director, Division of Enforcement; (14) Co-Director,
28

1 Division of Enforcement; (15) Senior Counsel, Division of Enforcement; (16) SEC
2 General Counsel; (17) Assistant General Counsel; (18) Associate Director, Disclosure
3 Review and Accounting Office; and (19) Deputy Chief Counsel, among others.

4 91. The day following his momentous, market-moving speech, on June 15,
5 2018, Hinman made the rounds on financial television shows to affirm that his speech
6 given yesterday was official guidance from Defendant. For example, during an interview
7 with CNBC’s Bob Pisani—where the emblazoned chyron read “SEC: BITCOIN AND
8 ETHER ARE NOT SECURITIES” during the conversation—Mr. Pisani asked Hinman
9 “You said in your speech neither Bitcoin nor Ether would be considered securities and
10 thus not under the purview of the SEC, can you fully explain what your reasoning is?”
11 Mr. Hinman responded, on behalf of the SEC, “When **we look at Ether** and the highly
12 decentralized nature of the networks **we don’t** see a third party promoter where applying
13 the disclosure regime would make a lot of sense. So **we’re comfortable . . .** viewing these
14 as items that **don’t have to be regulated as securities.**” [emphasis added]¹⁰

15 92. In another, ongoing federal case in the Southern District of New York
16 involving Defendant, Defendant affirmed to two federal judges that Hinman’s speech
17 was the official position of Defendant regarding the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU:
18 “**The Speech itself**—and the many drafts and comments by [Defendant] staff across
19 different SEC divisions and offices deliberating the agency’s approach to the regulation
20 of digital assets—**show that Director Hinman and other SEC staff used the Speech**
21 **to provided public guidance** as to how Corp[orate] Fin[ance] would apply the federal
22 securities laws to offers and sales of digital assets **including Ether.**” [emphasis added]¹¹

26 ¹⁰ This interview can be publicly viewed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF-0LeL8pk>.

27 ¹¹ See *Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ripple Labs, Inc., et al.*, Case No.
28 20-CV-10832 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2022), ECF 429 at 1-2.

1 93. In the same litigation months later, Defendant reaffirmed that Hinman’s
2 speech “*did* reflect Director Hinman’s personal views as the Director of Corp[orate]
3 Fin[ance] *and*, consequently, the view of the division he led.” [emphasis in original]¹²

4 94. The emails containing Hinman’s and the Defendant’s comments to his
5 speech were apparently so damaging to Defendant’s credibility that, in satellite litigation,
6 the Defendant fought for 18 months to prevent disclosing them. Two federal district court
7 judges ordered that the emails be disclosed.

8 95. One of the federal judges held that, in the course of the Defendant’s
9 obfuscation of its purported public service duties, the Defendant engaged in conduct that
10 was “hypocrisy . . . suggest[ing] that the SEC is adopting its litigation positions to further
11 its desired goal, and not out of faithful allegiance to the law.”¹³

12 **IV. PLAINTIFF—ALONG WITH MILLIONS OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS**
13 **AND BUSINESSES—IS SUBJECT TO IMMINENT HARM SUCH AS**
14 **SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL AND CRIMINAL RISK BASED ON**
15 **DEFENDANT’S ABJECT FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN GOOD FAITH**
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE INVESTING PUBLIC THAT IT
ALLEGEDY EXISTS TO “PROTECT.”

16 96. Hinman, on behalf of Defendant, provided public guidance that Defendant
17 did not view the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU as securities or investment contracts.

18 97. At the same time, Hinman did not disclose that he had a significant financial
19 interest in declaring on behalf of Defendant that the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU
20 were not securities or investment contracts.

21 98. Ex-Chairman Clayton refused on multiple occasions—when directly
22 asked—to state whether Defendant believed the Ethereum Network or Ether DCU are
23 securities or investments contracts.

24 99. At the same time, Clayton did publicly adopt Hinman’s speech at subsequent
25 public events that Hinman’s speech provided Defendant’s guidance to the public.

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¹² See *id.* at ECF No. 600 at 3.

¹³ See *id.* at ECF No. 531 at 6.

1 110. Defendant has refused to provide Plaintiff—or any person or entity—with a
2 public response as to whether use of the Ethereum Network and Ether DCU constitute
3 unlawful securities transactions under the Securities Act—for over *eight years*.

4 111. Without any prior notice, Defendant has initiated lawsuits against numerous
5 individuals and entities for damages stemming from Defendant’s allegations that DCUs
6 are securities or investment contracts.

7 112. Plaintiff therefore is subject to imminent harm and has no alternative but to
8 seek the intervention of this Court and request the Court grant the relief sought in this
9 matter as set forth below.

10 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

11 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court enter a declaratory judgment against
12 Defendant based upon the circumstances set forth above, including:

- 13 ■ A judgment that the Ethereum Network is not a security or investment contract
14 under the Securities Act;
- 15 ■ A judgment that the Ether DCU is not a security or investment contract under
16 the Securities Act;
- 17 ■ A judgment that transactional activity on the Ethereum Network does not
18 constitute sales and offers of securities requiring registration under the
19 Securities Act;
- 20 ■ A judgment that speculative offers and sales of the Ether DCU are not
21 securities under the Securities Act;
- 22 ■ A judgment awarding Plaintiff all appropriate damages in an amount to be
23 determined;
- 24 ■ A judgment awarding equitable, injunctive, and/or declaratory relief as may be
25 appropriate including, but not limited to, rescission, restitution, and
26 disgorgement;
- 27
- 28

